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Torre II. 
C0l\1MENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. 
What regulations should be made in regard to the 
commencement of hostilities? 
REGULATIONS. 
ARTICLE 1. Hostilities between the contracting po·wers 
must not con11nence without previous and explicit warn-
ing, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war 
or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war. 
ART. 2. The state of ·war 1nust be notified to the neutral 
powers without delay, and shall not take effect in regard 
to them until after the receipt of a notification, which 
may even be given by telegraph. Neutral powers, never-
theless, can not plead the absence of notification if it is 
established beyond doubt that they were in fact aware 
of the state of war. 
ART. 3. Article 1 of the present convention shall take 
effect in case of war between two or more of the contract-
ing powers. A.rticle 2 is binding as between a belligerent 
power ·which is a party to the convention and neutral 
powers which are also parties to the convention. 
:NOTES. 
lntrod?-tction.-Certain aspects of the subject of decla-
ration of war were considered in the International Law 
Situations of this Naval War College in the conference 
o£ 1910, and appear in the publication of that year as 
Situation II, pages 45 to 65. It was then shown that no 
unifor1nity of practice had prevailed in regard to time, 
method, or £orin of declaration, that there were reason'3 
why some regulation should prevail for the declaration, 
and that The Hague conference of 1907 had tried to meet 
this need in the convention relative to the opening of 
hostilities. 
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H a.gue convention 190'7, opening of hostilities.-Tiv~ 
Hague ~onference of 1907 considered the question of the 
opening of hostilities, both from the point of view of the 
belligerent and of the neutral. The result of the long 
and careft-il discussion \Vas a convention, of which the fol-
lowing are the essential articles: 
ARTICLE 1. The contracting powers recognize that hostilities 
between themselves must not commence without previous and 
explicit warning, in the form either of a declaration of war, 
giving reasons, or of an ultimatum, with a conditional declaration 
of war. 
This convention has now been adopted by most of 
the larger states of the world. 
The understanding of its significance as presented to 
the Secretary of State by the American delegates is showll 
in the following staten1ent from their official report: 
The convention is very short, and is based upon the principle 
that neither belligerent should be taken by surprise, and that the 
neutral shnll not be bound to the performance of neutral duties 
until it has received notification, even if only by telegram, of the 
outbreak of war. The means of notification is considered unim-
portant, for if the neutral knows, through whatever means or 
whatever channels. of the existence of war, it can not claim a 
formal notification from the belligerents before being taxed with 
neutral obligations. While the importance of the convention to 
prospective belligerents p1ay be open to doubt, it is clear that it 
does safeguard in a very high degree the rights of neutrals, and 
specifies authoritatively the exact moment when the duty of neu-
trality begins. It is for this reason that the American delegation 
supported the project and signed the convention. (60th Con g., 
1st sess., S. Doc. 444, p. 34.) 
It is to be observed that this convention establishes the 
principle that the declaration shall be previous to the 
opening of hostilities, but does not state how long before 
the opening of hostilities the declaration should be made. 
The propositions made for fixing a specified time bet~een 
the declaration of war and the opening of hostilities did 
not receive sufficient support in the conference to secure 
adoption. The committee concerned particularly with 
the formulation of the rules for the opening of hostilities 
called attention to the fact that the Institute. of Inter-
national La\v in 1906 had not been able to agree upon a 
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period for delay between declaration and opening of hos-
tilities, even when sitting in an unofficial capacity. The 
essential point is that th~ declaration shall be previous to 
the opening of hostilities. 
Recent declarations.-Recent declarations of war show 
the necessity for definite regulations. The date of the 
commence1nent of the Spanish-American War of 1898 
gave rise to n1any questions, some of which were taken 
t0 the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Spanish-American 1Var declaration, !1-pril ~5, 1898.-
According to the Constitution of the United States (Art. 
I, sec. 8, n.) Congress has po·wer "to declare war." 
On April 19, 1898, Congress passed the following: 
Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the 
people of Cuba , demanding that the GoYernment of Spain re-
linquish its authority and goYernment in the island of Cuba, and 
to withdraw its land and naYal forces from Cuba and Cuban 
waters, and directing the President of the United States to use 
the land and nayal forces of the United States to carry these 
resolutions into effect. 
Resolved by the Senate and I-I ouse of Representatives of the 
United States of A.merica in Congress assembled, First, That the 
people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free 
and independent. 
Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, 
and the GoYernment of the United States does hereby demand, 
that the Goyernment of Spain at once relinquish its authority 
and goYernment in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land 
and nava l forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. 
r.rhird. That the President of the United States be, and he 
ht'reby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and 
naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual 
service of the United States the militia of the seYeral States, 
to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions 
into effect. 
Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposi-
t ion or intention to exercise soyereignty, jurisdiction, or control 
oYer said island except· for the pacification thereof, and asserts 
its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the go"\""-
ernment and control of the island to its people. 
ApproYed April 20, 1898. (Foreign Relations U. S., 1898, p. 
765.) 
This resolution was ilnn1ediately dispatched to the 
.A.merican minister to Spain, ·with an ulti1natuin. 
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JJ1r. Sherman to j;Jr. Woodford. 
[Telegram.] 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
Washington, April 20, 1898. 
You have been furnished with the text of a joint resolution 
voted by the Congress of the United States on the 19th i~stant 
(approved to-day) in relation to the pacification of the island of 
Cuba. In obedience to that act, the President directs you to 
immediately communicate to the Government of Spain said reso-
lution, with the formal demand of the Government of the "Cnited 
States that the Government of Spain at once re1inquish its au-
thority and government in the island of Cuba and Cuban waters. 
In taking this step the United States hereby disclaims any dispo-
sition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or con-
trol over said island except for the pacification thereof, and 
asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the 
government and control of the island to its people under such 
ftee and independent govern1nent as they may establish. 
If, by the hour of noon on Saturday next, the 23rd day of April, 
instant, there be not communicated to this Government by that 
of Spain a full and satisfactory response to this demand and 
resolution, whereby the ends of peace in Cuba shall be assured, 
the President' will proceed without further notice to use the 
power and authority enjoined and conferred upon him by the 
said joint resolution to such extent as may be necessary to carry 
the same into effect. 
SHERMAN. 
(Ibid, p. 764.) 
Before J\1r. ""\Voodford had delivered the con1n1un1ca-
tion to the Spanish Government, the Spanish 1ninister 
o£ state sent to Mr. vVood£ord the £ollo-\ving note: 
In compliance with a painful duty, I ha Ye the honor to inform 
your excellency that, the President having app1·oved a resolution 
of both Cha1pbers cf the United , States which, in denying the 
legitimate sovereignty of Spain and in threatening armed inter-
vention in Cubu, is equin1lent to an evident declaration of war, 
the Government of His l\fajesty has ordered its 111inister in Wash-
ington to withdra'v without loss l f time from the North ..... -\.mericau 
territory with all the personnel of the legation. By this act the 
diplonmtic relations which previously existed between the two 
countries are broken off, all official communication between their 
respective rep'resentatives ceasing; and I hasten to communicate 
this to your excellency in order that on your part you may make 
such dispositions as seem suitable. (Ibid, p. 767.) 
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~1r. ''T oodford then (-A.pr. 21, 1898) requested his pass-
ports and "'\Yithdre'v fron1 Spain. 
Spain on April 21, 1898, at 7.30 a. n1. had stated that 
the threat of intervention in Cuba "is equivalent to an 
evident. declaration of war." 
The Spanish 1ninister at ''T ashington had requested his 
passports on .A .. pril 20 at about noon. ~1r. 'Voodford 
had been instructed on i\._pril 20 to remain near the Span-
ish Court in his capacity of 1ninister till noon of the 23d 
of ...._<\_pril unless previously handed his passports; and he 
did re1nain~ and diploinatic relations 'vere continued till 
the n1orning of ...._c\_pril 21. 
... :\. blockade of Cuban ports 'vas -proclain1ed on 1-\._ pril 22. 
On .. A .. pril 23, 1898, the Queen Regent of Spain issued 
a decree announcing the existence of war and declaring 
the ter1nination of the treaties " and all other agree-
n1ents, compacts, and conventions that have been in force 
up to the present between the two countries." 
On ..._-\.._pril 25, 1898, Congress, exercising its constitu-
tional authority, passed the following act: 
First. Thn t wnr be. and the same is hereby. declared to exist, 
and that wnr has existed since the twenty-first day of April, nnno 
Domini eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, including said day, 
beh\een the United Stn tes of America nnd the Kingdom of Spain. 
Second. That the President of the United States be. and he 
hereby is. directed and empowered to use the entire land and 
naYal forces of the United State~. and to call into the actual 
serYice of the United States the militia of the seYeral States, to 
such extent as may be necessary to carry this net into effect. 
(30 Stat.~ 36-±.) 
B~T this act of .. A .. pril 23 'var existed during the day of 
April 21 and fro1n that ti1ne. By the Spanish decree 
treaty relations "~ere superseded by 'v~u· on .1-\._pril 28; in 
fact, diplo1natic exchanges had taken place on April 21. 
The Supre1ne Court of the United States acknowl-
edged that war had e_xisted since and including 1-\._pril 21, 
and that captures subsequent to that day ·were valid. 
This was two days pr·ior to the Spanish decree_ and four 
days prior to the J-\._Inerican declaration. 
On the 25th of April President Thicl(inley, recognizing 
that the posi.ti.on of the lTnited States ·was not 'vell de-. 
fined, said in a communication to Congress, referring to 
the position of the Spanish Government as stated in the 
note to the American minister at ~1adrid : 
It will be perceived therefrom that the Go-vernment of Spain, 
having cognizance of the joint resolution of the United State~ 
Congress, and in view of the things which the President is thereby 
required and authorized to do, responds by treating the rea sonable 
demauds of this Government as measures of hostility! following 
with that instant and complete severance of relations bJ~ its action 
which by the usage of nations accompanies an existent state of 
war between sovereign powers. 
The position of Spain being thus made known and the denulnds 
of the united States being denied with a complete rupture of 
intercourse by the act of Spain, I haYe been constrained, in exer-
cise of the power and authority conferred upon n1e by the joint 
resolution aforesaid, to proclaim under date of April 22. 1898, a 
blockade of certain ports of the north coast of Cuba, lying be-
tween Cardenas and Bahia I-Ionda and of the port of Cienfuegos 
on the south coast of Cuba; and further, in exercise of m~~ con-
stitutional powers and using the authority conferred upon me by 
the act of Congress approYed April 22, 1898, to issue tny proclama-
tion. dated April 23, 1898, calling forth volunteers in order to 
carry into effect the said resolution of .April 20, 1898. Copies of 
these proclamations Pr.re hereto appended. 
In view of the measures so taken, and with a view to the adop-
tion of such other measures as may be necessary to enable me to 
carry out the exvressell will of the Congress of the United States 
in the premises, I now ~recommend to your honorable body the 
adoption of a joint resolution declaring that a state of war exists 
between the United States of America and the Kingdon1 of Spain, 
·and I urge speedy action thereon. to the end thrr t the definition 
of the international status of the United States as a belligerent 
power may be made known. and the assertion of all its right~ 
and the maintenance of all its duties in the conduct of a public 
war may be assured. (Foreign Relations "C. S., 1898, p. 771. ) 
From this it is plain that the status was not defined 
and assured until after the declaration, though the decla-
ration issued on the 25th of April was held to define the 
status existing as regards the belligerent rights of the 
United States subsequent to the 20th o~ ... ~pril. Under 
such conditions complications naturally arise not only as 
regards relations of belligerents but also as regards 
neutrals. , 
Under the provisions of The Hague convention there 
is required before commencement of hostilities a " pre-
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vious and explicit warning, in the form either of a decla-
ration of war giving reasons or of an ultimatum with 
a conditional declaration of war." 
In 1898 Congress did not formally declare war until 
after the opening of hostilities, for a blockade was de-
clared on April 22, 1898. This act of Congress was un-
questionably legal under the Constitution of the United 
States, though it would not now be regarded as in accord 
'vith the convention relative to the opening of hostilities. 
Even if Congress had not declared war at all, it would 
certainly have existed after the Spanish decree o.f April 
23. vVhether without declaration war would have existed 
on April 21 is open to question. Whether the signing 
of the convention relative to the opening of hostilities 
has in any way limited the· powers of Congress under 
the Constitution is a question that might be raised. How-
ever, as the United States has become a party to this con-
vention, it is, as regards foreign states signatories to the 
convention, bound by its provisions. A failure to observe 
the provisions of the conYention would render the United 
States liable. 
Further, it is sufficient to say that in a change so far 
reaching in its effects as a change fro1n state of- peace 
to a state of war, it is only reasonable that the time of 
the change should be unequivocally known both to the 
opposing belligerent and to neutrals. 
Tl~e ~dtimatum of the South African Republic, 1899.-
At the -time of the strained relations between the South 
African Republic and Great Britain, in 1899, the Re-
public issued an ulti1n~tum showing that it regarded 
concentration of forces near its borders as an act of war . 
.._\fter relating many grounds for action, the ultimatum 
says: 
Her :Majesty's unlawful interyention in the internal affairs of 
this Republic in conflict with the convention of London, 1884, 
caused by the extraordinary strengthening of troops in the neigh-
borhood of the borders of tbis Republic, has thus caused an in-
tolerable condition of things to arise whereto this Government 
feels itself obliged, in the interest not only of this Republic, but 
also of an South Africa, to make an end as soon as possible, and 
feels itself caned upon and obliged to press earnestly and with 
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emphasis for an immediate termination of this state of things 
and to request I-Ier J.\IIajesty's Government to give it the assur-
ance-
( a) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by 
the friendly course of arbitration or by whatever amicable way 
may be agreed upon by this Government with Her :Majesty's 
Government. 
(b) Tba t the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be 
instantly withdrawn. 
(c) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in 
South Africa since the 1st June, 1899, shall be removed from 
South Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon :with 
this Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee 
on the part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities 
against any portion of the possessions of the British Government 
shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations within 
a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the 
Governinents, and this Government will, on compliance there-
with, ·be prepared to wJthdra w the armed burghers of this Re-
public from the borders. 
(d) That Her :Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas 
shall not be landed in any port of South Africa. 
This Government must press for an immediate and affirn1ative 
answer to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her J\Iaj-
esty's Government to return such an answer before or npon Wed-
nesday, the 11th October, 1899, not later than 5 o'clock p. m., and 
it desires further to add that in the event of unexpectedly no 
satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval it 
will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of Her 
l\fajesty's Government. as a formal declaration of war, and will 
not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and that 
in the event of any. further n10vements of troops taking place 
within the above-mentioned time in the nearer directions of onr 
borders this Government will be compelled to regard that also as 
a formal declaration of war. 
The reply o:f Great Britain was short and war was held 
to exist at once: 
Her J\fajesty's Government have received with great regret the 
peremptory demands of the Government of the South African 
Republic conveyed in your telegram of 9th October, No. 3. You 
will inform the Government of the South _African Republic, in re-
ply, that the conditions demanded by the Government of the South 
African Republic are such as Her J\Iajesty's Government deem it 
impossible to discuss. 
Russo-Japanese lVar, 1904.-Tbe Japanese declaration 
of war against Russia was published on February 10, 
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1904. The Russian reply was published on the same 
date. The Ekaterinoslav and JJJ ukden, Russian steam-
ships, were captured with their cargoes on February 6. 
Other steamships ·were captured on February 7. On Feb-
ruary 8 the Japanese torpedo boats attacked the Russian 
fleet at Port Arthur. On the 9th other engagements took 
place and captures \Vere 1nade. Therefore the war was in 
full progress before any declaration was issued by either 
Japan or Russia. A decision of the Japanese court in 
the case of the Ekaterinoslav_ vvas to the effect that war 
existed from the time of the sailing of the Japanese fleet 
from Sasebo at 7 a. m. on February 6. Thus the Russo-
Japanese war began about four days before the declara-
tion was made, and it was legal war from that time. 
"The war commenced when the Japanese fleet left Sasebo 
with an intention of attacking the Russian fleet." 
There was much discussion of these acts, and Russia 
entered a strong protest, and the Japanese Govern1nent 
replied. It is certain that it was not generhlly kno·wn 
that war had commenced when the fleet sailed on Feb-
ruary 6, and it was not even known that the fleet had 
sailed. An ele1nent of uncertainty therefore existed. 
Turco-! talian War, 191.1.-It was announced in Ron1e 
late in September, 1911, that the Italian charge d'affaires 
at Constantinople had been authorized to present an ulti-
matum to the Turki.sh Government, stating the griev-
ances and demands of Italy. This ccmmunication vvas 
of the nature of an ultimatum with a conditional declara-
tion of war. As both Italy and Turkey had participated 
in the conference at The Hague in 1907, these States vvere 
naturally familiar with the convention relative to the 
opening of hostilities. There was, therefore, an attempt 
on the part of Italy to conform to the provisions of the 
convention. This is shown in the ulti1natum: 
During a long series of years the Government of Italy never 
ceased to make representations to the Porte upon the absolute 
necessity of correcting the state of disorder to which the Govern-
ment of Turkey had abandoned Tripoli and Cyrene. These re-
gions should be admitted to the benefits of the progress realized 
by other parts of the 1\iediterranean and Africa. 
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r.rhis transformation which is imposed by the general exigencies 
of civilization constitutes for Italy a vital interest of the first 
order by reason of the slight distance separating these countries 
from the coasts of Italy. Notwithstanding the attitude taken by 
the Government of Italy, which has always accorded its loyal 
support to the Imperial Government in the different political 
questions of recent times; notwithstanding the moderation and 
patience shown by the Government of Italy; its views concern-
ing Tripoli have been badly received by the Imperial GoYernment, 
but more than that, all enterprises on the part of Italians in the 
regions mentioned have been systematically opposed and unjusti-
fiably crushed. 
The Imperial Government, which to the present time ha s shown 
constant hostility toward all legitin1ate Italian actiYity in Tripoli 
and Cyrene, quite recently, at the eleventh hour, proposes to the 
Ro:ral Government to come to an understanding, declaring itself 
disposed to grant any economic concession compatible with 
treaties in force and with the higher dignity and interests of 
Turks; but the Royal Government does not now feel itself in a 
position to enter such negotiations, the uselessnesR of which bas 
been demonstrate9- by past experience and which far from con-
stituting a guarantee for the future, would be themselves per-
manent cnnses of disagreement and conflict. 
The Royal Government has receiYed from its consular agents in 
Tripoli and Cyrene information that the situation is extremely 
grave because of the agitation prevailing against Italian subjects, 
and which is evidently incited by officers and other functionaries 
of authority. 
'l'his agitation constitutes an imminent danger, not only to 
Italian subjects, but to foreigners of all nationalities, which re-
quires them, for their own security, to embark and leave Tripoli 
without delay. 
The arrival at Tripoli of Ottoman military transports, which 
the Royal Government bas not failed to obserYe, appears prelimi-
nary to serious events, aggravates the situation, and imposes on. 
the Royal GoYernment the obligation absolutely to prepare for the 
dangers which will result. 
The ItaliDn Governn1ent, having the intention henceforth to pro-
tect its interests and its dignity, bas decided to proceed to the 
military occupation of. Tripoli and Cyrene. 
This solution is the only one that will give Italy power to itself 
decide and itself attend to that which the Imperial Government 
doe~ not do. 
The Royal Government demands that the Imperial Government 
shrill giYe ord~r that the actual Ottoman representative shall not 
oppose the measure which will, in consequence, be necessary to 
effect this solution without difficulty. An ultimate agreement will 
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be requested between the two Governments to regulate the defi:r;littj 
siuation which will arise. 
The royal embassy at Constantinople is ordered to demand a 
decisive response on this subject from the Ottoman Government 
within 24 hours of the presentation to the Porte of the present 
document, in default of which the Italian Government will con-
sider itself as being obliged to proceed immediately with measures 
destined to assure the occupation. Ask, in addition, that the 
response of the Porte within the pedod of 24 hours shall· be cOin-
municated also through 'Turkish embassy at Rome. 
The reply of Turkey to the Italian ultimatum, though 
conciliatory, 'vas not regarded by Italy as satisfactory. 
The following is the text of the declaration handed to 
the Porte by the Italian embassy: 
Can·3ring out the orders of the King, the charge d'affaires of 
Italy has the honor to notify that the period accorded by the 
Royal Governn1ent to the Porte with a view to the realization of 
certain necessary measures has expired without a satisfactory 
reply reaching the Italian Government. 
The lack of this repl3r only confirms the bad will or want of 
power of which the Turkisl.l Government aiid authorities have 
given such frequent proof, especially with regard to the rights 
and interests of Italians in Tripoli and Cyrenaica. 
The Royal Government is consequently obliged to attend itself 
to the safeguarding of its rights and interests as well as its 
honor and dignity by all means at its disposal. 
The events which will follow can only be regarded as the 
necessary consequences of the conduct followed for so long by the 
Turkish a n thori ties. 
The rein tions of friendship and peace being therefore inter-
r upted between the two countries, Italy considers herself from 
this m~ ment in a state of war with Turkey. 
The undersigned consequently has the honor to make known 
to your highness that passports will be placed at the disposal of 
the charge d'affaires in Rome, and to beg your highness to hand 
him his own passp ::; rts. 
The Royal Government has likewise commissioned the under-
signed to declare that Ottoman subjects may continue to reside 
in Italy without fear of an attack on their persons, property, or 
affairs. 
DE 1\iARTINO. 
September 29, 1911. 
As Italy considered a state of war as existing, a definite 
hour from which this should date was announced, VIZ~ 
2.30 p. m., September 29, 1911. 
Ho~r E. 8cpt e111uer 2.9, J911. 
It is t fficia11y nnuonncell that, the Ottoman GoYernment hav-
ing failed to meet the demands contained in the Italian ultin1a tum, 
Imly and Turkey .. are in a state of war from lmlf-rmst two 
in the afternoon of to-cl<l~~. September 29.'' 
,,.l'he Italian GoYernment 'vill proYicle for the safety alike of 
Italians and foreigners of all nationalities in Tripoli and Cyre-
nnica hy all ine ms at its disposal. 
~\ blocknde of the entire const of Tripoli and Cyrenaica will 
be immediately notified to the neutral po,yers. 
Lin~itation of r·ules.-While the rules of the convention 
of 1007 1nake the previous and explicit declaration of 'var 
obligatory upon the contracting states~ there are circum-
stances under 'Yhich "Tar 1nay arise 'vithont declaration. 
Under such circtunstances .the early p1·inciples will pre-
YaiL and a subsequent declaration 111ay deter111ine when 
\Yar legally begins or the beginning 1nay be inferred from 
the first act of hostilities. \\Then one of the parties to the 
"rar is not a party to The Hague convention such a condi-
tion 1night arise. In case of civil "~ar the ordinary condi-
tions would be such as to render a declaration if not un-
necessary at least unusual. The early rules "rill there-
fore still be applicable to certain cases, even if those of 
1007 are generally adopted. 
Fo11m of declaration of war as regards belligerents.-
That war should not co1nmence 'vithout a forn1al decla-
ration 'Yas recognized practice an1ong the ancients. In 
the :Nlicldle ~\.ge5l three days' notice 'vas son1eti1nes re-
quired. Heralds vvere sent in advance ever after the 
days of Grotius~ during the early part of the seventeenth 
century. Fro1n the beginning of the eighteenth century 
the practice 'yas Yaried, by far the larger nu1nber of 'vars 
haYing been begun 'vithout previous declaration. 
'"rhe recall of diplo111atic agents has been the usual pre-
lin1inary act of the government. indicating that relations 
are strained to such an extent that \Yar may soon follow~. 
but 'var does not necessarily follo'v, as the difference be-
t,Yeen the states 1nay be adjusted. T'he nature of the 
diplo111atic negotiations or of discussions in the parlia-
l11ents 111ay indicate that 'var is threatening~ but none of 
these evidence:s constitutes a declaration of war. 
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An ultimatun1 Inay be iss~1ed containing a demand for 
satisfaction. Such an ultimatum is usually formulated 
in diplomatic terms, \Yhich would not n1ake it t oo difficult 
for the state to vvhich it is dispatched to find a way to 
adjust the difficulties. The ulti1natun1 usually fixes the 
tim~ vvithin which an answer n1ust be 1nade. The United 
States required that Spain reply to its demand for with-
drawal of Spanish forces from Cuba within three days; 
i. e., by April 23. War was declared on April 25. An 
ultin1atun1 in itself does not necessarily involve a declara -
tion of vvar unless the failure to comply with the demands 
carries vYith it a conditional declaration of vvar. 
The British de1nands upon Venezuela in 1902 required 
an i1nmediate satisfaction of certain clain1s, and con-
cluded: " This con1munication must be regarded in the 
light of ultimatun1." The failure of Venezuela to satisfy 
these clai1ns did not lead to an in1mediate war, but to an 
atte1npt to establish a pacific blockade vvhich subsequently 
took the form of a true blockade. 
vVhatever the preliminary negotiations or evidences of 
strained relations which might have received considera-
bon prior to 1907, a1nong those states now parties to the 
con vent ion relative to the opening of hostilities, it is now 
necessary that there be a previous and explicit warning. 
This previous and explicit warning may take the form 
of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ult imatum with 
a conditional declaration of war. 
The reasoned declaration of war was regarded by many 
as necessary or at least very desirable because the oppos-
ing belligerent should be given a formal statement of the 
grounds of the vvar and the neutrals should not suffer 
such great changes in their ordinary rights and obliga-
. tions without knowledge of the reasons. 
If instead of the reasoned declaration of war, the ulti-
matum with conditional declaration vvas employed, the 
reasons for the breaking off of peaceful relations would 
be stated in the ultimatum. . 
T he exact wording of the declaration or ultimatum 
would na turally vary according to circumstances, but 
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should be previous and explicit. That the beginning of 
.a status -which changes the legal and other relations of 
states and individuals and introduces risks and obliga-
tions where none had previously existed should be clearly 
-d.efined scarcely needs argtunent. The possibility of in-
justice to innocent parties has been very great under the 
old system of uncertainty which prevailed under the 
·doctrine that war commenced 'vith the first act of hostil-
ity 'vhen there was no -vvay of defining 'vhat constituted 
.an act of hostility. 
Col. Tinge, of the Chinese delegation at the Second 
Hague Conference, 1907, said that it would be serviceable 
to define the term war, f or under the name of expedi-
tions there . had been numerous examples of invasions of 
his country. 
Oom.mencement of hostilities.-The Hague convention 
provides "the contracting powers recognize that hostili-
ties between themselves must not comn1ence without pre-
vious and explicit warning." 
The discussions at The Hague in 1907 show that " pre-
vious " simply means before in time, but does not imply 
that any specified period of priority is involved. 
There is in the convention no definition as to "]'hat con-
stitutes the commencement of hostilities before 'vhich ex-
_plicit warning must be given. 
D r . J . ~1. Spaight , writ ing in 1910, says: 
It is, of course, the aggressor who is bound to n1ake th e formal 
declaration of war. E very nation ha s the right to defend itself 
-from at tack. Continental jurists, while requiring a declaration 
fron1 the belligerent who takes offensive a ction , ad1nit tha t it is 
·n ot required from the party repelling a hostile enterprise. Blunt-
s chli a.dds that a defensive war may necessa rily have, fo r military 
Tensons, to take the form of offense. "From the point of view 
·of law the difference between the offensive and defensive war lies 
not in the fact of being the first to cross the fron tiers or invade 
the hostile territory, lJut in the difference of the respective rights 
-of the parties." Hence he would dispense with a declaration 
where the threatened belligerent forestalls his adversary in self-
·d efense. The doctrine is a dangerous one; aggressors are usually 
... able to satisfy themselves that they are acting on the defensive. 
B luntschli's view has no warranty in the convention of 1907. The 
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belligerent who strikes first, whether he is really acting on the 
defensiYe and bis aggression is merely a tactical mode of self-pro-
tection or not, is bound to giYe notice. as lnicl down in the first 
article. (War Rights on Land, p. 24.) 
... A ... state "\vhose frontier adjoined a state "\Vith which it 
had had or might have difficulties might double the num-
ber of troops along this frontier. It Inight assemble all 
its troops along this frontier. \Vould this be the coin-
Inenceinent of hostilities? \Vould the other state be jus-
tified in regarding this as an act of 'var? If both states 
are parties to the conYention and "\Var follo'.YS, "\vould 
the state placed at a disadvantage by the assembling of 
its opponent troops on the frontier have a right to main-
tain that the convention had been violated? 
If the naval forces of a state had been similarly as-
sen1bled in an advantageous position, "\Vould this be the 
con11nence1nent of hostilities? The asse1nbling of the 
vessels Inay be of yastly 1nore ·weight than the firing of 
guns in the determination of the issue if war arises. 
Such being the case in regard to Inany acts on land 
and sea whieh Inay be in the nature of veiled threats, 
there ahvays rmnains the right of the state against which 
the threat is directed to den1and in an ultimation given 
rf'asons, the "\vithdrawal of the threatening force, or even 
to de1nand that the forces be not assmnbled in such a 
rnanner as to be a threat. Of such action each state 
n1nst be judge. ri'here is nothing in the principles of 
international la"\Y "\vhich "\Vonld forbid the placing of its 
troops in any part of its own territory or the 1nove1nents 
of fleets in any direction on the seas. 
As "\vas sho,vn in the International La"\v Situations in 
1910, pages 45 to 65, there 1nay be conditions uncler "\Yhich 
the principles recognized previous to 1907 ·would pre-
vail as in civil "\var, "\Yhen the first act involving the use 
of 1nilitary force n1ay be regarded as the con11nence-
111ent of hostilities and the opening of "\Var. In case of 
strained relations bebveen states the perfonnance or 
failure to perforn1 an act specified in an ultin1ahun or in 
a conditional declaration of "\Var 1nay be regarcled as the 
beginning of a state of -vvar. 
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florn-u of declaration as regards neutrals.-The rule of 
'_fhe Hague convention relative to the opening of hostili-
6es provides: 
The existence of n st:tte of war mnst be notified to the neutral 
powers without delay. 
That the belligerent 1nay not be negligent in making 
this notification, it is further p~ovided that the obliga-
tion of neutrality co~1sequent upon the existence of a 
state of \var "shall not take effect in regard to them 
until after the receipt of a notification, \vhich may, how-
ever, be given by telegraph." 
Certain possibilities of co1nplications are introduced 
by the added clause: 
Xeutra l powers, neyertheless, can not rely on the absence of 
notificn tion H it is clenrly established that they were in fnct 
aware of the existence of a state of war. 
It is presumed that the burden of proof of the notifi-
cation of the existence of a state of war \vould be upon 
the belligerent, and such proof might be difficult to 
establish. 
There \Vere at The Hague conference in 1907 several 
propositions looking to the establishing of a period o:f 
tin1e after notification to the neutral during which period 
the obligations of neutrality should not be operative. 
The Belgian delegate suggested that the obligations of 
neutrality should becon1e operative 48 hours after the 
receipt of the notification of the existence of war. It \Vas 
pointed out that this n1ight give occasion to the idea 
that neutrals might during this period act with i1npunity 
in a manner contrary to the obligations of neutrality. 
It n1ight further be said that if the neutral is to be al-
lowed a period after the notification in which neutral 
obligations shall not he binding, the aim of the bellig-
erent on the offensive would be to have this period at 
such a time as ·would be of least advantage to his oppo-
nent. This question \Vould: therefore, becon1e one enter-
ing into the belligerent's considerations in determining 
the ti1ne of 'the declaration of war. As the belligerent 
'vould ordinarily wish to engage his opponent before he 
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had had tin1e to prepare, and as a period o£ free coin-
Inerce with a neutral would add to the opportunity tO> 
prepare, the belligerent on the offensive would often be 
influenced to declare 'var suddenly or in advance o£ a 
period which n1ight otherwise elapse. 
Prof. Westlake's opinion.-Pro£. J. Westlake ·said 
concerning the Second Hague Convention relative to· 
the opening o£ hostilities : 
This regulation coinddes with the doctrine which we have laid 
down aboYe. Only two remarks are needed in order to put the 
matter in a clear light. One is that the declaration of war is now 
expressly required to be motiYee, which the declarants haye al-
ways made it for their own justification. The other is that the 
commencement of hostilities without a preceding declaration, in 
such peculiar cases as are contemplated above, is left possible· 
by the faet that the parties are not made to contract that they 
will not commence hostilities agninst one another otherwise than 
as described, but recogni?.:e that hostilities ought not (ne doivent 
pas) to be otherwise eommencecl. 
Notlling can more clearly show the impossibility of insisting· 
on an interval of notice between a declaration of war and a com-
mencenlent of llostili ties under it than the fact that the very 
moderate proposal of a 24 hours' inten·al, made by the delega-
tion of the Netherlands, was not accepted. 'rhe conference has 
therefore rather confirmed than ·weakened the necessity that, in 
order not to be taken unprepared, every nation n1ust rely on its 
own vigilance and on no formal rule. (vVestlake's Int. Law, 
Part II, War, p. 267.) 
Reason8 fot· Ii ague rules.-The discussion at The· 
Hague in 1907 centered about the regulations in regard 
to the opening o£ hostilities 'vhich had been proposed 
and 'vhich followed closely those o£ the Institute o£ In-
ternational Law at its season o£ 1906. As these 'vere in 
their essential principle's the. sa1ne as those finally adopted,. 
it is ·well to set forth the reasons £or the French proposi-
tion. The reasons £or their presentation 'vere set forth 
by Gen. Amourel, one o£ the French delegates: 
En commen~ant la discussion du Projet de Reglement sur· 
l'ouYerture des h cstilites que la Delegation fran~aise a eu l'hon-
ueur de sonmettre a vos deliberations, il n'est sa~s doute pas 
inutile qu'elle vous fournisse quelques explications de nn ture a 
justifier les termes de sa proposition. 
Elle estime tout d'nbord qu'il faut ecarter la supposition d'une 
guerre faite sans raison serieuse etappat·l~nte, ou sans qu'il se soit 
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produit au moins un incident susceptible, de donner lieu a une 
discussion. Une agression en pleine paix, sans motif plausible, 
n'est plus con1patible aYec le sentiment public des Etats du monde 
ciYilise que nons representons ici. 
La guerre nnra done ponr origine nu moins un fait. nyant une 
certaine gravite, et pouYant m '-'tiver nne echange d'explications. 
Alors comn1encera habituellement la periode de negociations 
diploma tiques, n u cours desquelles chaque Puissance cherchera i\ 
obtenir de l'autre des conditions propres a satisfaire ses interets. 
Si l'accord ne se realise pas, l'une des Puissances pent avoir 
recours a Ja menace de guerre en fixant, par voie d'ultimatum, les 
concessions qu·ene exige. Elle fixe aussi, en general, un delai 
de reponse, apres lequel elle se reserve de faire appel aux armes. 
Quand les evenements se produisent sons cette forme, au debut 
d'un conflit entre deux nations, il est bien certain que l'etat de 
guerre se trouYe declare d'une fa~on suffisante: l'ultima tum porte 
en lui-meme l'avertissement prealable et non equivoque; il indique 
la concession exigee, et par consequent la cause de la guerre en 
cas de refus; enfin, il limite n1eme la guerre dans le temps, selon 
l'heureuse expression de notre excellent collegue de la Delegation 
de Russie, puisque l'etat de guerre commence a la lin1ite du delai 
de reponse. 
)1ais n se peut que le fait, origine du conflit, ne soit pas tou~ 
jours suivi d'une conYersation diplomatique. Dans certains cas, 
le dommage materiel on moral cause a uu Etat lui paraitra assez 
graYe pour qu'il ne juge pas possible de n'en pas chercher repara~ 
tion par les armes. Il en est ainsi parfois dans les conflits entre 
deux individus, lorsque les temoins de l'un r~oiyent mission de 
reclamer uniquement nne rencontre. 
Il se peut aussi que, au cours ·des negociations diplomatiques, 
celles-ci prennent nne tournure telle que le reclamnnt perde tout 
espoir d'obtenir par cette yoie des conditions suffisantes. Il pourra 
fort bien alors rompre brusquement l'entretien, et avoir recours a 
la force pour s'assurer la satisfaction qu'il juge necessaire. 
Dans ces deux cas, que la guerre eclate immediatement ou 
pendant les pourparlers, elle commencera par la manifestation 
inopinee de la volonte expresse de l'une des Parties en presence. 
~Iais il semble que, meme alors, l'ouverture des hostilites doit se 
fain~ ayec les memes garanties que lorsque la guerre eclate a l~ 
suite d'un ultimatum. 
L'avertissement prealable et non equivoque et les motifs de la 
guerre se trouvent donne dans l'ultimatum lorsqu'il en est fai t 
usage; nous den1andons qu'ils soierit compris dans une notifica-
tion a l'adversaire. lorsque l'une des Parties prend la resolution 
de co mba ttre. sans a voir commence, on epuise, la discussion dipq 
lorna tique. 
Il n'est pas necessaire de justifier la condition que l'a vertisse-
ment doit etre non equivoque . . Il devra aussi etre prealable. 
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Nous entendons par l:l qu'il doit preceder les hostilites. l\iais 
celles-ci pen vent commencer des que l'a v~rtissement sera 11aryenu 
a l'adYersaire. La limitation de la guerre clans le temps sera 
ainsi moins nettement determinee que dans le cas de I' ultima ttun. 
Nous estimons, en effet, que les necessites de ln guerre moderne ne 
V<~rmettent pa~ de demnnder, a celui qui rr la yolonte d'a ttaquer, 
cl'autres delnis que ceux qui sont absolurnent indispensables pour 
que son ac1Yersa1re sache que la force va etre employee contre lui. 
Nons pensons nussi que la declaration de gnerre doit etre 
llJOtiYee; cette condition nous semble pouvoir etre facilement ac-
ceptee, parce que les Puissances, ne se decidant a combattre que 
lorsqu'elles sont bien conYaincues de leur droit, ne peuvent 
hesiter a le vroclamer publiquemeut. En outre, il est particu-
lieremeut utile que les motifs de la gueire ~oieut portes a la 
connaissnnce des l~:ta ts non meles n u '~oufli t mais qui vout en 
souffrir, et qui ont le droit de sa Yoir pourquoi ils souffrent. Enfin, 
ces n1emes l~tats, s'ils sont au courant (1es causes de la guerre, 
seront peut-etre mieux disposrs a offrir leurs bons offices, tout en 
respedant les interets en presence. 
Ainsi. se tronYent expliques les tennes de l'nrticle rr de notre 
Projet de Reglement. Quant a !'article 2, il YOUS pal:aitrn sans 
doute necessnire que l'etat de guerre, qui n'interesse pas seule-
ment les belligerants, ma is qui npporte a ussi un grand trouble 
clans les affaires des pays neutres, soit notifie le plus tot 11ossible 
a ceux-ci. 
Cela n'est-il pas d'ailleurs necess;t ire si ron yeut mettre les 
neutres en mesure de remplir le rOle que leur reseryeut les articles 
6 et 27 de ln Conyention du 28 juillet 189!)'? 
Tels sont, l\fessienrs, les motifs que la DeH~gation franr,aise avait 
a vous exposer a l'appui de sa vroposition, et el1e serait heureuse 
que cel1e-ci put receYoir votre 11ssentiment. (Denxieme Confe-
rence Interna tiounle. Tome III, p. 168.) 
The general report, presented after the co1nmittee had 
fully considered the question of coininencement of hos-
tilities and formulated the regulations, does not add 
1nuch to the reasons stated by the representative of the 
French delegation. (Deuxie1ne Conference Interna-
tionale, To1ne I, pp. 131-136.) 
Form of declaration of war.-A revie'v of the forms 
of statement of declarations of 'var shows that no one 
form has been follo,ved. Certain requisites are evident. 
'The declaration havjng the effect of changing the rela-
tions of the states in such a far-reaching 1nanner 1nnst 
be n1ade by a co1npetent authority and to a con1petent 
authority. 'rhe con1petent authority InaY be deter1nined, 
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by the don1estic· hnv of a state as in the United States 
" Congress has po\\rer to declare war." 
The declaration should be unequivocal. ~he change 
of relations from peace to \Var should not be a n1atter 
o:f uncertainty. All parties 'vho n1ay be affected by the 
existence of 'var have a right to know the fact. 
A notice prior to the co1nn1encement o£ hostilities 
should be given as the dat.e at 'vhich acts of hostility 
becon1e valid should be established before rather than 
after the act or by the act. 
_.._-\s 'var is in itself so serious it is generally held that 
there should be a reason for ·'var and that the state enter-
ing upon hostilities should announce the reason. Of 
course, it is well understood that the apparent 1nay not 
always be the real reason, and so1netin1es it 1night be best 
:for all parties that the reason be not too fully stated lest 
it 1nake return to peace 1nore difficult. 
The declaration should of course be public and fonnal~ 
as the conduct of foreign states is also influenced by the 
state o.f \Var. These essentials of the fonn of a ·declara-
6on of \Yar are si1nple and necessary in order that it 
1nay be valid and fnlly operative, Yiz, the declaration of 
"\Var should be fron1 the con1petent authority. in an un-
equivocal forn1, and published prior to the coininence-
n1ent of hostilities, and should give a reason for the 'var. 
Suggestions as to other requiren1ents for a valid declara-
tion haYe been 1nade, such as that the causes should be 
stated in full, 2± hours or son1e' 1ninin1lUn of ti1ne should 
elapse bet,veen the publication of the declaration and 
its opera ti.on~ etc. l_,~1ese have not yet 1·eceived sufficient 
support to be regarded as essential. 
The declaration should therefore be: 
1. Fron1 the competent authority. 
2. To the cotnpetent authority. 
3. Previous to the opening of hostilities. 
4. Explicit and unequiYocal. 
5. Reasoned. 
The 1netliod of notifying a neutral in order that there 
1nay be as little difference in interpretation as possible 
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should be a simple transn1ission to the proper neutral 
authority of a copy of the declaration made to the enemy. 
Resume.-The survey of practice and opinion indicates 
that the rules proposed in 1907 at the conference at The 
Hague reflected general opinion. Any 'vide departure 
fron1 these rules 'vould not at present receive. much sanc-
tion. l\1ost authorities contend that the main aim is to 
kno'v definitely 'vhen 'var begins, if 'var is to be under-
taken, <lnd to kno'v son1ething of the reason for the war. 
Considering this condition of affairs the follo,ving Hague 
rules are thought sufficient: 
REGULA1l'IONS. 
ARTICLE 1. Ilostilities bet\veen the contracting powers must not 
commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form 
either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultima tum with 
conditional declaration of war. 
ART. 2. The state of war must be notified to the neutral powers 
without delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until 
after the receipt of a notification, which may even be given by 
telegraph. Neutral powers, nevertheless, can not plead the ab· 
sence of notification if it is established beyond doubt that they 
were in fact a ware of the state of war. 
ART. 3. Article 1 of the present convention shall take effect in 
case of war between two or more of the contracting powers. 
Article 2 is binding as between a belligerent power, which is a. 
party to the convention, and neutral powers, which are also 
parties to the convention. 
' 
TOPIC III. 
LI::\IITATION OJ<' AR::\IAl\IENTS. 
"'Vhat attitude should be assun1ed in regard to the limi-
tation o£ armaments? 
CONCLUSION. 
In view o£ the evident differences o£ opinion and diffi-
culties the wish expressed at 1"'he Hague in 1907 n1ay be 
reaffirmed, viz, that the Governments " examine the pos-
sibility o£ an agreement as to the lin1itation o£ armed 
forces by land and sea and o£ war budgets." 
NOTES. 
General.-Fron1 the days o£ the saying that " all things 
are £air in war " there has developed in modern tin1es 
a very decided opinion to the contrary. Restrictions upon 
the means and n1ethods o£ injuring the enemy have been 
in1posed. l\1any plans £or doing a way with the evils o£ 
war have been proposed. · 
On August 24, · 1898, the Russian Czar caused his 
minister to hand to the diplomatic representatives at St. 
Petersburg a rescript which set forth the dangers o£ in-
creasing armaments, and stated that-
r_ro put an end to these incessant armaments and to seek the 
means of warding off the calamities which are threatening the 
whole world-such is the supreme duty which is to-day imposed 
on all states. 
Filled with this idea, His l\1ajesty bas been pleased to order 
me to propose to all the Governments, whose representatives are 
accredited to the Imperial Court, the meeting of a confereuce 
which would have to occupy itself with this grave problem. 
This conference should be, by the help of God. a happy presage 
for the century which is about to open. It would converge in 
one powerful focus the efforts of all states which are sincerely 
seeking to make the great idea of universal peace triumph over 
the elements of trouble and discord. 
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